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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by 
Utah Code Annotated S 78-2-2(3)(J). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS MAY ACCEPT AN APDITUR 
AND AN APPEAL NONETHELESS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This is a question of law, which may be 
reviewed without difference to the trial court. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). 
II. WHETHER THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF FILED ITS MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL OR AN APDITUR PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
IS SIGNIFICANT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This is a question of law, which may be 
reviewed without difference to the trial court. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). 
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING THE APDITUR IN THIS CASE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The trial court's order will be reviewed only 
for a manifest abuse of discretion. Smith v. Shreeve. 551 P.2d 
1261 (Utah 1976). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is determinative in 
this appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a trial court's order 
granting plaintiff a new trial if the defendants did not consent 
to an additur. Defendants failed to choose between a new trial 
or the additur. Instead, defendants appealed without a final 
order. The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the prior appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction finding the appeal premature. 
The trial court's original order stated in pertinent 
part: 
In assessing such damages, the jury awarded only a 
little more than half the medical and other special 
damages testified to by the only witnesses on this 
point called by the plaintiff. 
The jury's assessment of general damages did not 
take into account the pain and suffering of plaintiff 
to date, nor that attributable to the surgery, as 
testified to by Dr. Smith. 
Based on the foregoing considerations, the court 
grants the plaintiff's motion and directs to the sum of 
$15,000 be added to the judgment or if the defendant 
refuses such additur, the court grants a new trial of 
this matter. 
(R. 259). 
In order to avoid a new trial, defendants voluntarily elected the 
additur. After acceptance of the additur, defendants appealed. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
After coming to a complete stop at a stop sign, 
defendant Bowles failed to yield the right-of-way and collided 
with the plaintiff. As result of defendant's negligence, 
plaintiff suffered various injuries, including a degenerative 
disc condition which will require future surgery. 
This matter was tried in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, State of Utah, and a Judgment on a Special 
2 
Verdict was entered on or about June 12, 1992. (R, 252). 
P u or in the alternative an additur, 
which motion was granted on or about July 
Because defendants had not responded to the order granting the 
new jested I ia 1 setting for * * » 
on or about August 1992. (R. 262) Defendants 
plaintiff's request for a trial setting, stating that they 
i n t ended il iippcri I  Mic « n \\v\ c o n d i t i o n a l l y granting a new t r i a l . 
(R. 2 7 0 ) . 
Defendants gave notice of appeal on or about August 13, 
: „= , minute entry ordered 
defendants 1 choose within thirty days either an additi i 
new trial on August 19, 1992 27 1) Th - . -
court subsequeri holding that the 
trial court was divested of jurisdiction due to the notice;1 u! 
appeal on September 29, 1992. (R. 306). 
C):i i o : bober il 3, :i 9 9 2, 1:1 I = 111 « 11 ! \ iiprerne Court dismissed 
defendants' first appeal holding that the appeal was premature 
and c* consequence the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. 
(R, ~ t on October 
20, 1992. The trial court then ordered the defendants to choose 
between the additur or a new trial on October ?.s
 t 1992* (R* 
31 61 . 
Defendants accepted the additur and submitted an 
amended judgment on the special verdict reflecting the additur, 
which judgment was entered -ecembei I, I i r.» , (I \ i . K > ) . 
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Defendants then appealed the judgment they had submitted on 
December 13, 1992. (R. 344). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The plaintiff's argument first asks this court to 
reconsider the procedural issues brought up by plaintifffs motion 
for summary disposition. Plaintiff's motion addressed whether 
defendants have followed the correct procedure for review of an 
order granting a new trial or an additur. Plaintiff argues that 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3, 4, and 5 control the situation. Plaintiff 
incorporates by reference its previous arguments made in her 
motion for summary disposition. 
Defendants argue that a reservation of right to appeal 
was made when defendants submitted the judgment. That 
reservation of right is not reflected in the judgment, nor can a 
right of appeal be created when it does not exist. Most 
importantly, defendants have not followed the procedure as 
outlined by the rules and the precedent in Utah which states that 
if the party wants to review a ruling under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that party must seek either an 
interlocutory appeal (which defendants did not), or go through a 
new trial. Since there is a procedure already established, the 
appellate court should not now throw away precedent and the plain 
language of the rules in order to allow defendants to succeed in 
attempting to reinstate the jury's verdict. 
Defendants argue that a party may not file a motion for 
4 
a new trial prior to the entry of judgment. In response, 
plaintiff asks the court to look at the language of the rule 
which sets a deadline, not a window of opportunity. In addition, 
the Rules of Civil Procedure in the State of Utah fall under the 
general jurisprudential category of notice pleading, wherein the 
parties are to be put on the notice of the other party1s 
intention, and not kept within the strict and narrow bounds of 
the long gone writ system which proved unjust. A court's ability 
to accept a motion for a new trial prior to the entry of judgment 
is certainly not jurisdictional, given the fact that a trial 
court obviously has jurisdiction up to the moment it enters 
judgment, and even under Rules 59 and 60 the trial court has 
jurisdiction for sometime thereafter. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting plaintiff an additur. A trial court is given great 
discretion in amending judgments or granting new trials in that 
the trial judge viewed the evidence and the witnesses at the time 
of trial, and thus is a better judge of their credibility than 
the appellate court can be. The trial court's order granting the 
additur stated specific reasons as to why the additur was 
granted. As the evidence in this case was so one-sided, the 
trial court could easily find that the jury's verdict was against 
the great weight of evidence. As to whether a verdict is against 
the great weight of evidence may in some circumstances invite 
argument. Such is not the case here. As stated, the case was 
completely one-sided, as many of the medical injuries suffered by 
5 
plaintiff were established and never rebutted by defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I, DEFENDANTS HAVE MOT FOLLOWED THE 
CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER 
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL OR AN ADDITUR, 
Plaintiff hereby incorporates its argument and citation 
to authority submitted in its motion for summary disposition in 
this appeal. In addition to that memorandum, plaintiff wishes to 
apprize the court of the following facts. Procedurally, this 
case appears to be in chaos. Defendants' first appeal was 
dismissed as being premature.1 Utah case law has already set 
out the correct procedure which defendants should have taken in 
this case.2 In discussing orders granting new trials, the 
Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
If such power is in fact exercised arbitrarily, the proper 
redress is either in a petition for interlocutory appeal, 
which may be granted in the proper case; or the claimed 
error can be preserved for review if necessary upon the 
final outcome of the case. 
Haslam v. Paulsen, 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964). 
Such a case is the one before the court. Defendants claim that 
the trial court exercised its powers under rule 59 of Utah Rules 
*In appellant's response to appellee's motion for summary 
disposition, appellant found it significant the court did not 
hold that a defendant may not appeal the granting of an additur. 
The fact is not significant at all, considering that the Utah 
Supreme Court did not address the question. 
defendants recognized the proper recourse and that through 
acceptance of an additur they would waive their right to 
challenge it. "If a defendant accepted an additur, he would 
waive the right to challenge it or be estopped from challenging 
it." (Defendants' response to summary disposition in first 
Appeal at 6) (R. 294). 
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of Civil Procedure arbitrarily (or in a abuse of discretion) in 
granting the additur. The proper redress, if error did occur, 
would have been an interlocutory appeal or taking a new trial. 
The case of Boden v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958) 
is most illustrative in this case. Discussing new trials under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and additurs and remittiturs, the 
court stated: 
We are not here concerned with any question as to whether 
the disparity in the verdict is so gross as to indicate that 
the whole verdict is so fused with passion and prejudice 
that it should be entirely set aside. The contention here 
is that the verdict is outside limits of what appears 
justifiable under the evidence to the extent that it should 
not be permitted to stand. In such instances the remedy is 
to order a modification of the verdict to bring it within 
the evidence; and the adverse party is given the choice of 
accepting it or taking a new trial. This alternative does 
not infringe upon the right of a trial by jury, because the 
party favored by the order has had his trial by jury and is 
seeking relief from the inadequacy of the jury verdict, or 
the party adversely affected always can choose the new trial 
if he so desires. 
Id. at 828 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Boden gave two examples, one 
of remittitur and one of additur. The court explained: 
Example 1: P sues D for $200 for destruction of two horses; 
the evidence shows that of the plaintiff's two horses, 
valued at $100 each, defendant destroyed only one. The 
jury, in disregard of the evidence and the instructions, 
nevertheless renders the verdict of $200. There is no 
foundation for the verdict and the evidence, and it should 
not be permitted to stand. Yet, it would be futile to go 
through the formality of granting and having a new trial to 
arrive at the correct judgment of $100. In order to avoid 
such futility of procedure, courts have adopted the sensible 
expedient of ordering the judgment reduced to the amount 
justified by the evidence (in such case $100), where the 
plaintiff is allowed to accept or take a new trial. 
Example 2: Same facts as example 1, except the evidence 
shows the defendant destroyed both horses. The jury, in 
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disregard of the evidence and the instructions, renders a 
verdict for only $100. For the same reason as stated in 
example number 1 above, the court should order the verdict 
increased to the correct amount, $200, which the defendant 
should be allowed to accept, or take a new trial. 
Id. at 829. 
Since the defendants in this case had the choice of a new trial 
or an interlocutory appeal, and chose not to follow the precedent 
laid out in Utah law, they should not be allowed to elect the 
additur and now request review of the trial court's order. The 
time for interlocutory appeal is long past,3 and accordingly the 
trial court's judgment including the additur should be affirmed 
on this basis alone. 
Defendants in their brief reach the erroneous 
conclusion that the Rules of Appellate Procedure support their 
position that an amended judgment incorporating an additur is 
appealable. The court will remember that the Utah Supreme Court 
in Boden was construing Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendants attach significance to the fact that Rule 
4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure distinguishes between 
the court granting of motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend a 
judgment and a court denying a motion for a new trial under Rule 
59. In this sense, defendants miss the very heart of the trial 
3Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) provides: 
An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought by 
any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 
20 days after entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the 
action. 
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court's order below. The order below granted a new trial unless 
the defendant accepted the additur. By acceptance of the 
additur, the trial court most assuredly meant that the defendants 
would pay the judgment and the litigation would be put to an end. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 does not address conditional 
grants of motions for new trial. As defendants have recognized, 
a motion granting a new trial is not appealable. (See 
Appellant's Brief at 13). Motions granting a new trial 
contingent upon an additur are not appealable either. 
In such a case as this, where a so called reservation 
of right to appeal has been made but is not reflected in the 
judgment, such reservation should be given no effect. The 
prominent purpose of an additur or a remittitur, which the court 
in Boden obviously recognized, is that when the defendants so 
elect they put the litigation to rest. Defendants have attempted 
to avoid such result in this case. 
The court in Fairfield v. America Photocopy Equip. Co., 
322 P.2d 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) held that a plaintiff had waived 
any right to appeal where he had accepted a remittitur, even 
where the plaintiff agreed to the remittitur under protest. The 
court in Fairfield stated: 
It is settled that by agreeing to reduce the verdict 
and enter a judgment for a lesser amount, a successful 
plaintiff waives his right to appeal, even though he 
made the remission under protest and the court may have 
erroneously found the verdict to be excessive. 
Id. at 95 (emphasis added). 
Conversely, it should be held that by agreeing to an addition to 
9 
the verdict and to an entry of judgment of a greater amount, a 
defendant waives his right to appeal, even when he accepts the 
additur under protest. 
In this case, the court correctly found the verdict to 
be inadequate and the defendants agreed to an increase, and their 
protest is of no effect. The defendants have waived their right 
to appeal. 
In sum, given the precedent in Utah found in Haslam and 
Boden, the rules as viewed together (Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, 4, & 5) and 
common sense, this court should affirm the judgment as entered, 
including the additur.4 
II. A PARTY MAY FILE A MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
In defendants' docketing statement they state in a 
section designated "Issues Presented by the Appeal:" "Did the 
trial court have power to consider plaintiff's request for an 
additur or a new trial, which was not served within ten days 
4Although Utah Law is abundantly clear that defendant in 
this matter has followed the wrong procedural avenue for redress, 
plaintiff concedes that there are not many Utah cases addressing 
additurs. Most parties understand the nature of an additur and 
therefore do not dispute the matter further after its election. 
Accordingly, there is not a large amount of post-judgment 
litigation after an additur is accepted. 
Procedurally viewed, there is no difference between an 
additur or a remittitur in that they are both conditionally 
given. The electing party is free to accept the granting of a 
new trial instead of making an election. As stated, Utah case 
law is clear that if a new trial had been granted 
unconditionally, no appeal as of right would exist, and the 
defendant in this case would have to wait until a final order was 
issued in order to appeal the earlier granting of a new trial. 
Haslam v. Paulsen. 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964). 
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after the entry of judgment, as required by Rule 59(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure?1' (Docketing Statement of Appellant at 
4). Defendants have not addressed this issue at all in their 
brief. Perhaps, this is because they realize they did not raise 
this issue below and therefore may not appeal it,5 or that their 
position was non-tenable. Nevertheless, plaintiff will address 
the issue as it was brought up in the docketing statement. 
The plain language of Rule 59 should control. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) provides: MA motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than ten days after the entry of 
judgment.11 (emphasis added). The rule itself says nothing about 
whether a motion for a new trial can be served earlier than ten 
days after the entry of judgment. It is clear from the language 
of the rule that it establishes, not a window of opportunity in 
which a party may make such a motion, but instead a deadline 
after which any such motion may not be made.6 
5Banaeter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). 
6In appellant's response to appellee's motion for summary 
disposition appellants state that filing a motion for a new trial 
prior to the entry of judgment raises a jurisdictional issue as 
to whether a trial court has power to consider a motion. 
(Appellant's response to motion for summary disposition at 1). 
Appellee has trouble believing that such a contention is raised 
in good faith. It appears obvious that until the judgment is 
entered, and where no interlocutory appeal has been taken, it is 
only the trial court that has jurisdiction. The trial court is 
not divested of jurisdiction after the jury returns its verdict. 
As rule 59 and 60 clearly establish, a trial court has 
jurisdiction over a matter even after a judgment is entered. The 
trial court must have jurisdiction prior to the entry of 
judgment. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated and based 
upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Both sets of rules 
are established and recognized to effectuate what is commonly 
11 
Ill, THE TRIAL COURT WAS COMPELLED TO MODIFY THE 
VERDICT BECAUSE THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, 
Defendants in their brief state: 
In any event, the trial court made no finding that the 
jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice# 
nor that the verdict was insufficient to justify the 
jury's verdict, nor that the verdict was "against law." 
(Brief of Appellant at 16-17). 
The trial court is not required to parrot the words of a statute. 
The trial court stated that the jury disregarded half of the 
evidence as to medical and other special damages, and the trial 
court found that the jurors assessment of the general damages did 
not take into account the evidence of future pain and suffering 
some of which would be precipitated by surgery. As a result, the 
trial court found the jury had misapplied or failed to take into 
account proved facts and that the verdict clearly indicated a 
disregard for competent evidence. The order of the court 
granting plaintiff an additur or a new trial if defendants did 
not accept the additur states in pertinent part: 
The matter of liability was directed by the Court. The 
issue of causation of plaintiff's injury by defendant 
was found by the jury and an award of $12,000 for 
specials and $5,000 general damages was made. 
The foregoing was based on the court's 
instructions that on the finding of causation the jury 
known as notice pleading. Under notice pleading, it is 
understood that the purpose of pleadings is to give the adverse 
party notice as to what actions the other party may want to take. 
Clearly, serving a motion before entry of judgment pursuant to 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the adverse 
party adequate, in fact more than adequate, notice of what that 
party intends to do. The adverse party cannot reasonably argue 
that they are prejudiced in any way by a motion being submitted 
before the deadline outlined in the statute. (See generally 61A 
Am Jur. 2d § 1-3). 
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was to assess damages for the full amount of 
plaintiff's injuries although the defendant's 
negligence may have aggravated or light up (sic) a 
latent, dormant, or a symptomatic condition. 
In assessing such damages, the jury awarded only a 
little more than half the medical and other special 
damages attested to by the only witnesses on this point 
called by the plaintiff. 
The juror's assessment of general damages did not 
take into account the pain and suffering of the 
plaintiff to date nor that attributable to the surgery 
as testified to by Dr. Smith. 
Based on the foregoing considerations the Court 
grants the plaintiff's motion and directs that the sum 
of $15f000 be added to the judgment or if the defendant 
refuses such additur, the Court grants a new trial in 
this matter. 
(R. 259-260). 
This order was clearly within the court's discretion pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) and (6). Rule 59(a)(5) and 
(6), the provisions under which this motion was originally made, 
provide that a new trial or amended judgment may be granted if 
the verdict exhibits: 
(5)excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6)insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
or other decision, or that it is against the law.7 
The Utah Supreme Court in Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d 
701 (Utah 1961) stated that a new trial is warranted when: 
[T]o the trial judge, "it seems clear that the jury has 
misapplied or failed to take into account proved facts: 
or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made 
findings clearly against the weight of evidence.. . ." 
7The appellant has stated that the court made no findings as 
to passion or prejudice. (Appellant's brief at 1). Such a 
finding was not required by the court. It is clear under the 
rules that the court could have given the plaintiff award of an 
additur under 59(a)(6). 
13 
Id. at 704 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court also stated: 
Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter 
exclusively for the jury and unless such an award 
clearly indicates the jury's disregard of competent 
evidence. . ., the trial court may not interfere with 
the jury's determination. 
Battv v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court's order granting a new trial, quoted above, shows 
that the trial court found that the jury had misapplied and 
failed to take into account proved facts such as evidence of past 
and future medical expenses of plaintiff, the past damages which 
would be considered special damages, and the pain and suffering 
attendant to future surgery which should have been considered 
under general damages.8 The court also found that the jury's 
verdict exhibited that the jury had misunderstood or disregarded 
the law or probably made findings clearly against the great 
weight of evidence in that a jury instruction was given and it 
was shown that defendant's negligent acts had aggravated or 
lighted up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition. The 
trial court's order clearly reflects that it considered the 
precedents established by Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
As both defendants' and plaintiff's briefs have 
outlined, in order to reverse the trial court, this court must 
8See Dupois v. Nelson. 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981) (When a 
damage award indicates a disregard of the evidence by the jury, a 
court may entertain a motion for an additur). 
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find that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in 
granting the new trial or the additur. Page v. Utah Home Fire 
Ins. Co.. 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964).9 Given the 
evidence that was before the trial court, and the deference which 
must be given to the trial court in this matter, it cannot be 
said that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Damages in this case were established by a number of 
witnesses. A Dr. Lyle Jacobs testified as Ms. Terry's treating 
physician; Dr. Charles Smith testified as defendants' independent 
medical examiner; and Dr. Wing testified as a radiologist who had 
only a slight connection to this case; Coral Terry, the 
plaintiff, testified herself; Douglas Terry, the plaintiff's 
husband, testified as to the changes in plaintiff's life; and 
Duane Hutchings, plaintiff's employer, testified as well. The 
plaintiff Coral Terry testified as to her condition prior to the 
accident and how the accident has changed her life. (See 
generally testimony commencing at R. 702). 
Mrs. Terry explained that she experiences pain when driving 
and that she often has muscle spasm in her back. (R. 715). Mrs. 
Terry states that she wakes up frequently at night in pain; she 
9The court in Page recognized the broad discretionary power 
of the trial court granting or denying motions for new trials, or 
remittitur and additur as well established. This discretion is 
necessary to allow the court an opportunity to re-examine or 
correct jury verdicts or findings which it believes to be in 
error, or where there is substantial doubt that the issues were 
fairly tried. 
See also Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991): Schmidt v. Intermountain Healthcare. Inc.f 635 P.2d 
99 (Utah 1981) . 
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noted that this occurs almost every night. (R. 715- 716). Mrs. 
Terry testified that the activities she once loved to engage in 
are no longer available to her. (R. 717). Mrs. Terry testified 
that she cannot play with or take care of her grandchildren as 
she could before the accident and as she wishes she could now. 
(R. 722). When asked why she had not asked the doctor for more 
pain medication, or why she had not taken more medication for her 
injuries, Mrs. Terry explained that she is a health-conscious 
person who does not like taking drugs. (R. 730). When asked 
whether she plans to have surgery, Mrs. Terry explained that 
although the medical provider's testimony during the trial had 
scared her somewhat concerning potential surgery, she still 
intends to have the surgery performed in order to alleviate her 
problems. (R. 774). 
Douglas Terry, plaintiff's husband, testified as to the 
pain and restrictions which plaintiff currently experiences. Mr. 
Terry testified that Mrs. Terry was extremely active before the 
accident, but is now extremely limited in what she is able to do. 
(R. 766-770). 
Duane Hutchings, plaintiff's employer, testified as to 
the asymptomatic nature of plaintiff's pre-existing condition. 
He noted that plaintiff had not shown any signs of being in 
discomfort or pain prior to the accident. (See generally 
testimony of Duane Hutchings commencing at R. 676). Mr. 
Hutchings also testified that it is "highly probable" that Coral 
Terry lost an estimated $8,000 in lost sales, which can be 
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attributed to the accident because she could not work in her 
sales position for long periods of time as a result of the 
accident. (R. 690). 
Dr. Lyle Jacobs testified as Mrs. Terry's treating 
physician. Dr. Jacobs is a board certified orthopedic surgeon. 
(R. 524). Dr. Jacobs testified that the plaintiff experiences 
muscle spasm often and that she has sub-occipital tenderness with 
a limited range of motion. (R. 179). Dr. Jacobs diagnosed the 
cause of these symptoms as whiplash. (R. 180). Dr. Jacobs 
diagnosed both a degenerative disc disease in plaintiff's back as 
well as posterior midline disc bulging. (R. 188). Dr. Jacobs 
noted a continuation of these symptoms which he felt indicated a 
permanent nature. (R. 190). Dr. Jacobs also noted an arthritic 
change in the plaintiff and recommended a fusion and excision 
(discectomy) as the proper course of treatment. (R. 191). 
Dr. Jacobs attributed the degeneration of the disc and 
the posterior midline disc bulging, as well as the arthritic 
change to the accident caused by the defendant. (R. 192). As a 
result, Dr. Jacobs, based on his objective findings and the past 
medical history of the patient, gave an impairment rating of 6 
percent whole body in this case. (R. 193). 
Dr. Charles Smith testified as an independent medical 
examiner. Dr. Smith was asked to examine plaintiff by defense 
counsel in this matter. (R. 588). Dr. Smith noted a restricted 
range of motion and a degeneration of the cervical disc. (R. 
590). Dr. Smith found that any pre-existing condition which may 
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have existed was asymptomatic prior to the accident. (R. 598). 
Dr. Smith found what he considered to be a 10 percent impairment 
of Mrs. Terry which could be attributed solely to the accident 
herein litigated. (R. 598; R. 650). Dr. Smith noted a 
disability in plaintiff in that she had suffered a functional 
loss. (R. 599). Dr. Smith stated that this disability arose out 
of the accident. (R. 600). 
Since Dr. Smith was called as an independent medical 
examiner by the defendants, he reviewed the accident report and 
all records which he might have indicated a pre-existing 
condition. (R. 600). However, his opinion based on these 
records and findings was that the pre-existing condition was 
asymptomatic and that the current symptoms which plaintiff was 
suffering were caused by the accident at issue herein. (R. 601). 
Dr. Smith stated "She will be stuck with a substantial amount of 
residual," and that she most likely would require surgery. (R. 
601). Specifically, Dr. Smith indicated that she would need a 
fusion and discectomy. (R. 603). 
The surgery will be both painful and expensive. 
Defendants' IME, Dr. Smith, estimated that therapy would last at 
least five months. (R. 607). Dr. Smith estimated the surgery 
would cost at least $2,000.00. (R. 609). Anesthesia for the 
surgery could cost as much as $1,000.00. (R. 609). X-rays prior 
to the surgery would cost $600.00. (R. 609). The plaintiff will 
be required to wear braces after the surgery and these will cost 
in the neighborhood of $150.00. (R. 610). 
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The therapy required will consist of approximately 
three to five visits per week for six weeks. Dr. Smith indicated 
the plaintiff may need to go everyday, and that each session 
would cost up to $50.00 per session. (R. 610). 
The hospital stay arising out of the surgery will cost 
anywhere from $4,500 to $15,000. (R. 613). Accordingly, Dr. 
Smith's testimony indicated that the future surgery alone could 
cost from $10,000 to $20,000. It is this evidence the trial 
court felt the jury had ignored and failed to apply.10 
In addition to those costs cited above for future 
surgery, Dr. Smith also indicated that the plaintiff will need 
household help for six months. (R. 611). Dr. Smith also 
anticipated that plaintiff would lose wages in that plaintiff 
would not be able to work from six to eight weeks, and for that 
period would only be allowed to work part-time for an additional 
six to eight weeks. (R. 614). 
Dr. Smith again stated in his testimony, after relating 
the costs of the injuries, that he believed the surgery was 
necessary and that the need for the surgery arose out of the 
accident herein litigated. (R. 616). Evidence was also 
submitted that the plaintiff was currently using a neuro-
stimulator which had been given her by defendants' independent 
examiner. Dr. Smith's testimony was that the package of 
instruments needed for this neuro-stimulator cost approximately 
10The trial court specifically found that the jury's award of 
general damages did not reflect any compensation for future pain 
and suffering. 
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$3,000.00. (R. 617). 
Dr. Smith felt that much of the plaintiff's pain came 
from the irritation of the greater occipital nerve. (R. 635). 
Dr. Smith opined that it was more likely than not that plaintiff 
would get the surgery. (R. 643). Dr. Smith specifically stated 
that the degenerative disc disease was not from simple aging, but 
from trauma induced by the accident herein litigated. (R. 654). 
The only medical provider called by the defendants was 
Dr. Wing, a radiologist. Dr. Wing stated that he had never seen 
the plaintiff or examined her. (R. 667). He stated that he only 
looked at x-rays. (R. 667). Dr. Wing substantiated previous 
testimony stating that plaintiff does have an abnormality in the 
disc and a degenerative condition. (R. 667). While Dr. Wing 
could not name a cause for these conditions, he said that it was 
possible for other practitioners to arrive at such a conclusion. 
(R. 670). Dr. Wing related that the x-ray taken in February of 
1989 which he reviewed did reveal what could be muscle spasm. 
(R. 674). Dr. Wing compared that February 1989 x-ray with a 1991 
MRI, but came to no conclusive analysis. Dr. Wing stated that he 
could not make a comparative analysis between the 1989 x-ray and 
the 1991 MRI because such a comparison would be "fraught with 
error." (R. 675). Certainly a comparison that is fraught with 
error does not rise to the level of a reasonable medical 
certainty which is required for expert medical testimony. Other 
than the facts cited above, Dr. Wing did not refute any of the 
other doctors' testimony as to damages. 
20 
Under Utah law, damages must be awarded for preexisting 
condition that is aggravated by a subsequent accident. Biswell 
v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The evidence in 
this case is that the plaintiff had a preexisting injury to her 
back, but that injury was asymptomatic and that the accident in 
this case lighted up and aggravated that injury. Both Dr. Smith, 
defendants' own IME, and Dr. Jacobs testified as to damages and 
future costs the plaintiff would incur. Both stated the 
plaintiff's alleged preexisting condition, if there was any, was 
asymptomatic. The evidence was conclusive that plaintiff's 
condition was attributed to the accident sued upon, and that 100 
percent of her disability was caused thereby. 
Defendants did not rebut this evidence. Defendant 
William C. Bowles had nothing to offer as far as evidence of 
damages are concerned. 
In sum, Dr. Smith, defendants' own IME, estimated that 
the future costs of surgery could be as much as $20,000, 
exclusive of necessary costs for household assistance after 
surgery. The future damages also should include the 
rehabilitation time off work. There was an undisputed $4,000 in 
medical expenses incurred to the date of trial. The special 
damages that were undisputed at trial, both past and those that 
would be necessarily incurred in the future, exceeded $28,000 
with an additional, somewhat disputed amount of $8,000 loss of 
profit. In candor, plaintiff would concede that the $8,000 was 
raised by defendants on cross-examination, but was not 
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significantly rebutted. Therefore, special damages as proved by 
the weight of evidence totaled over $36#000. 
There is also uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Smith and 
Dr. Jacobs on permanent impairment, which is completely objective 
based on loss of actual function. The corresponding disability 
is supported by the testimony of Dr. Smith as well as the 
testimony of plaintiff, her husband, Mr. Terry, and her employer, 
Mr. Hutchings. The court's order granting an additur took into 
account that the jury must have misapprehended this objective 
evidence. 
The future surgery which will be required is a cervical 
discectomy/fusion which will result in very significant pain and 
suffering regardless of the possible stoic nature of the patient. 
All of this evidence was substantially uncontroverted, 
substantially objective, and apparently disregarded by the jury. 
The trial court recognized that there was little, if any, 
evidence supporting defendants' theory of the case. Because the 
evidence was so one-sided, and the jury did not base its verdict 
on the evidence presented or the applicable law, the trial court 
granted a new trial. The trial court reasonably concluded that 
the jury misapplied or failed to take into account the proven 
facts, or misapplied or disregarded the law, and on this basis 
granted an additur which should be sustained. 
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
This court has the power to grant the plaintiff 
damages, specifically attorney's fees, pursuant to Utah Rule of 
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Appellant Procedure 33. Both this appeal and defendants' prior 
appeal would come under the definition of frivolous appeals as 
they are not warranted by existing law. The Appellate Court 
should note that no attorney's fees or costs were provided in the 
previous appeal which was dismissed as being premature. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 also provides a basis for recovery of 
attorney's fees in this case, as a reasonable inquiry would have 
shown that no basis for this appeal exists. Defendants have 
never argued for an extension of current law. 
Defendants earlier appeal in this matter attacking the 
trial court's granting of a new trial or an additur was similarly 
dismissed by the Utah Supreme Court. Defendants have accepted 
the benefit of avoiding a new trial by accepting the additur 
while at the same time trying to contest the very order by which 
the benefit was conferred. These two appeals combined have 
incurred a great expense on the plaintiff as well as a general 
delay in receiving the judgment she is due. 
Because the plaintiff has been forced to respond to 
these appeals, the plaintiff should be entitled to both costs and 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants have not followed the correct procedure for 
review of an order conditionally granting a new trial in that 
they have not followed the correct appellate procedure or the 
correct precedent in Utah which establishes that defendants 
should have filed an interlocutory appeal, which they did not, or 
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accept a new trial. 
It is clear from the language of Rule 59 of Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure that a party may file a motion for a new trial 
prior to entry of judgment. The rule establishes a deadline and 
not a window of opportunity. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting an additur or a new trial where it found that the jury 
had disregarded large amounts of evidence and misapplied the laws 
of Utah. Accordingly/ plaintiff would ask this court to sustain 
the additur and the entry of judgment reflecting that additur. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /"-~ day of «afreh^ 1993. 
FFERY>cr. 
uk-sr YOU IVIE^ST YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ajjpeal with postage prepaid thereon this 
day of Maiteh, '1993/ to the following: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt LaXe City, Utah 84111 
9190J13 
Secretary ^Z) 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Coral Terry, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 9 J*^7& - C# 
v. 
William C. Bowles, an individual, 
and US West Communications, 
dba Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
B. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 
C. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 
D. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 
E. Order Granting a Conditional New Trial 
F. Dismissal of Appellants' First Appeal 
G. Amended Judgment Reflecting Additur 
ADDENDUM A 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment-
CD Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from .having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the triaL 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
ADDENDUM B 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal foam all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together 
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the 
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket An appeal shall be docketed 
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identi-
fied as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
ADDENDUM C 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
ADDENDUM D 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory 
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic-
tion over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the 
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in the 
appellate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the 
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together 
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition 
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied, 
the filing fee shall be refunded. 
(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain: 
(1) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the con-
trolling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the 
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon; 
(3) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal 
should be permitted; and 
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance 
the termination of the litigation. 
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from 
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and opinion. 
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party 
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies 
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The petition and any answer shall be 
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness 
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and 
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particu-
lar issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, 
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court 
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have 
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent 
to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for 
appeals from final judgments. 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL* DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 
CORAL TERRY, 
Plaintiff, Case Number: 910400402 
vs. RULING 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, SENIOR JUDGE 
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, 
Defendant. 
********** 
This matter i s before the Court on the p l a i n t i f f ' s motion 
for an addi ture or in the a l t e r n a t i v e , a new t r i a l . 
The matter of l i a b i l i t y was directed by the Court. The 
i s s u e of causation of p l a i n t i f f ' s injury by the defendant was
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found by the jury and an award of $12,000.00 for spec ia l s and 
$5,000.0 general damages was made. 
The foregoing was based on the Court 's i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t 
on the finding of causation the ju ry was to assess damages for the 
f u l l amount of p l a i n t i f f ' s i n ju r i e s although the defendants 
neg l igence may have aggravated or l i g h t up a l a t e n t , dormant, or 
asymptomatic condition. 
In assessing such damages the jury awarded only l i t t l e 
more than half the medical and o the r special damages t e s t i f i e d to 
by the only witnesses on t h i s point cal led by the p l a i n t i f f . 
The jurors assessment of general damages did not t ake 
i n t o a c c o u n t the pain and s u f f e r i n g of p l a i n t i f f t o d a t e , nor t h a t 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to the s u r g e r y , as t e s t i f i e d t o by Dr. Smi th . 
Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h e Cour t g r a n t s 
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s motion and d i r e c t s t h a t t h e sum of $15 ,000 .00 be 
added t o t h e judgment o r i f defendant r e f u s e s such a d d i t u r e , t h e 
C o u r t g r a n t s a new t r i a l of t h i s matte*-
Dated t h i s 2.-' day of J u l y , 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
c c : R. P h i l I v i e , Esq. 
F loyd Jensen, Esq. 
ADDENDUM F 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
October 1 3 , 1992 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
J e f f e r y C. P e a t r o s s 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y Avenue 
P .O. Box 672 
P r o v o , UT 84603 
C o r a l T e r r y , 
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l e e , 
v . 
W i l l i a m C. Bowles , an i n d i v i d u a l , 
and US West Communications, dba 
M o u n t a i n S t a t e s Te lephone and 
T e l e g r a p h Company, 
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s . 
P l a i n t i f f ' s mot ion f o r summary d i s m i s s a l i s t h i s day 
g r a n t e d . I n i t i a l l y , de fendants d i d n o t respond t o t h e 
g r a n t i n g o f t h e a d d i t u r , but o b j e c t e d and appealed when 
p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a mot ion f o r new t r i a l b e c a u s e de fendant s had 
n o t r e s p o n d e d . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g , g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s 
u n t i l September 2 3 , 1992 , t o respond was proper in r e p o n s e t o 
p l a i n t i f f ' s motion which l e f t t h e c a s e b e f o r e th t r i a l 
c o u r t . T h i s appeal i s t h e r e f o r e p r e m a t u r e , and t h i s c o u r t 
l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
No. 920387 
910400402 
Geof frey J . B u t l e r 
Clerk 
ADDENDUM G 
FLOYD A. JENSEN, Bar #1672 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-7418 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MCKRL4ED lljO±>±t 
CORAL TERRY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an individual, 
and U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, 
dba MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON 
SPECIAL VERDICT, WITH 
ADDITUR 
Civil No. 910400402 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
The above entitled action having come before the Court for trial on the 26th, 
27th and 28th days of May, 1932. The plaintiff having been represented by Jeffery 
C. Peatross, IVTE & YOUNG, and defendants having been represented by Floyd 
Jensen, testimony having been taken and argument of counsel having been 
heard, the jury returned a special verdict as follows: 
"1 . Was the negligence of defendant, Bowles, in the January 30, 1989, 
accident a -proximate cause of plaintiff, Coral Terry's injuries? 
Yes X No 
"2. If your answer to the above question is yes, proceed to answer 
question number 3. If your answer is no, so indicate and sign and return this 
Special Verdict to the court. 
"3. What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Coral Terry, for the 
damages, if any, which she sustained as a result of the incident: 
a A. For special damages $ 12.000 
UB. For general damages $ 5.000* 
Based on the foregoing verdict, on June 12, 1992, the Court (Ballif, J.) 
entered a Judgment on Special Verdict in the amount of "SEVENTEEN 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000) with interest to be included on special damages 
of $12,000 from the date of the loss until entry of judgment at the rate of 8% per 
annum, together with costs in the amount of $53°.QO to assessed pursuant to 
Rule 54 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ 
On July 23, 1992, pursuant to and granting Plaintiffs Request for an 
Additur or a New Trial, filed June 2, 1992, the Court (Ballif, Ret. J.) entered its 
ruling granting an additur in the amount of $15,000, or if Defendants refused 
such additur, a new trial. 
Defendants having timely filed their Acceptance of Additur dated November 
10, 1992, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($32,000) with interest to be included on special damages of $12,000 
from the date of the loss until entry of judgment at the rate of 8% per annum, 
together with costs in the amount of $ , to be assessed pursuant 
to Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. _ 
DATED AND SIGNED this > dav of tlcJc.U' kC^ . 19 7 7 . 
